A Defence of Separatism
Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one an...
Main Author: | Millar, Boyd |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Seager, William |
Language: | en_ca |
Published: |
2010
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1807/26306 |
Similar Items
-
A Defence of Separatism
by: Millar, Boyd
Published: (2010) -
Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomalnej (Phenomenal Consciousness and the Problem of Intentionality. About Phenomenal Intentionality)
by: Paweł Gładziejewski
Published: (2011-12-01) -
Conscience et intentionnalité : une évaluation critique des théories de l’intentionnalité phénoménale
by: Tison, Rémi
Published: (2020) -
Revisiting Phenomenal Intentionality
by: Farid Masrour
Published: (2016-04-01) -
Davor Pećnjak and Tomislav Janović, Towards Dualism: Essays in Philosophy of Mind, Ibis grafika: Zagreb, 2016
by: Luca Malatesti
Published: (2019-02-01)