The normative authority of our fully informed judgments
In my thesis, I consider some recent objections to the full information account of the good. I examine a particular line of argument advanced by Connie Rosati. Rosati argues that the judgments of our fully informed selves lack normative authority for us. She claims that the full information account...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en en_US |
| Published: |
2007
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1993/796 |
| Summary: | In my thesis, I consider some recent objections to the full information account of the good. I examine a particular line of argument advanced by Connie Rosati. Rosati argues that the judgments of our fully informed selves lack normative authority for us. She claims that the full information account does not allow us to address properly questions about what kind of person to be because the account identifies a person with her current motivational system. We may hold personal ideals that conflict with our current motivational system. But I argue that by treating personal ideals as a part of one's motivational system, the full information account can address properly questions about what kind of person to be. Rosati is also concerned with the changes that an agent would have to undergo in order to become fully informed. We might end up with a different motivational system once fully informed and so our fully informed judgments will lack normative authority for us. I argue that the changes to an agent's motivational system postulated by the full information account are beneficial changes. So I conclude that Rosati has not undermined the normative authority of our fully informed judgments. |
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