| Summary: | I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something
about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those
theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental
scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face
value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they
are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world.
I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so
leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with
Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and
argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the
nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity
theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without
reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of
laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to
account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s
contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s
ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that
some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the
nomic realist. === October 2006
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