| Summary: | This thesis concerns the effects of network member features on the pricing of automated teller
machine (ATM) transactions. The first chapter outlines the development of ATM networks and
provides an institutional and public policy backdrop for the theoretical and empirical analysis in the
thesis. ATM fees have recently received increased attention in North America due to the Interac
abuse of dominance case in Canada and the widespread introduction of surcharge fees at ATMs in
the United States.
In Chapter 2, a new circular spatial model of ATM networks is developed and used to
analyze the pricing preferences of banks when choosing to link their proprietary ATM networks into
a shared network. This model captures the consumer trade-off between the inconvenience of
travelling to a machine of their own bank and the fee charged to use the machine of a rival bank.
In this chapter, there are two banks, which differ only with respect to the size of their client bases.
The results show that the smaller bank's preferred common transaction fee always exceeds that of
its larger competitor. The bank with the larger client base will always choose to link networks
provided that the common fee charged by both banks is non-negative. For both banks there is always
a range of common fees for which there is mutual gain from linking the networks. When surcharges
are allowed, both banks have an incentive to raise fees above the common fee that was charged
previously.
In Chapter 3 the model is adapted to consider the effects of an asymmetry in the number of
machines owned by each bank. For the same client base in each bank, the results show that the bank
with the larger number of machines prefers a higher common fee than does its rival. When
surcharges are allowed, the bank with the larger number of ATM machines will choose to price
discriminate by location of machine. Such behaviour has been observed in the United States.
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