| Summary: | This study employed a bioeconomic, mathematical programming model to analyse ranch
resources allocation among cattle and game animals, and Kenya's wildlife conservation and game
harvesting policies. The objective function was comprised of discounted net income flows over
30 periods of 6-months each (15 years) and was optimised subject to the population dynamics
(modeled as logistic growth functions), initial animal populations and institutional constraints
(Kenya Wildlife Service policies). Game animal harvests were modelled as decay functions,
while carrying capacity in the logistic growth models is a function of rainfall. Cattle population
is modelled as a linear difference equation.
Simulation results show that abandoning the earlier preservation policy that placed the
burden of wildlife conservation on private landowners was a good decision. If continued, the
pre-1989 game animal preservation policy would likely not only dissipate available rent, but also
extinguish non-competitive animal species, thus making this policy economically unfavorable
and biologically unsustainable. After 1989, ranchers were granted (limited) user rights to
wildlife, but wildlife ownership continued to reside with the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). In
this study various ways in which KWS could exercise ownership are examined. The objectives of
KWS are to conserve wildlife ungulates while providing appropriate economic incentives to
ranchers. The current policy of attaining this objective is by allowing ranchers to harvest a given
proportion of the game populations. Simulation results indicate that this policy is non-optimal
and only marginally sustainable. When a Shannon biodiversity index is used as a constraint, game
conservation was also found to be unsuitable. The biodiversity index can be attained at very low
population levels, making its sustainability questionable. A better alternative is constraining the
end-period populations to be equal to or greater than initial populations. This policy yields a
reasonable net return and is unambiguously sustainable. The best policy, however, combines the end-period constraint with a policy that gives landowners full property rights. Ranchers can use
animals in any way they wish. This approach yields a much higher net return than any other
policy and is also unambiguously sustainable. A summary of simulation results is provided in the
following table. [Table]
|
|---|
