| Summary: | This thesis takes the form of three essays about the labour market implications of
job quality.
In the first essay, I demonstrate, by analysing a two-type, two-period example, that
high introductory wage offers can signal the quality of experience jobs. In this game,
one type of firm - the “good” type - offers higher expected quality jobs. If this type
is less likely to exit from the industry than the “bad’ type, it can increase expenditure
on introductory wages without being mimicked, distinguishing it from its inferior. The
game has many equilibria with these separating wages. In each, the introductory
compensating differentials have the opposite sign to the usual case: higher expected
quality jobs pay more, rather than less.
In the second essay, I present Canadian evidence that tests and supports the theory
of compensating differentials for a variety of job characteristics. The data used are
from the National Survey of Class Structure and Labour Process in Canada (NSCS).
These self-report data are preferable to the more conventional occupational-trait data;
they provide information on individual jobs rather than averages across broad
occupational categories and industries.
In the third essay, I focus on the mismatch between the educational requirements
of jobs and the educational attainments of workers. Using NSCS data, I find that the
returns to over- and undereducation for males are sensitive to the level of required
education. There is evidence of positive returns to overeducation for jobs that require
a university bachelor’s degree; but, in general, the returns are insignificant.
Undereducated workers are penalised in jobs with low educational requirements. For
females, I find that the returns to over- and undereducation are insignificant for all
levels of required education.
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