| Summary: | This thesis accepts the premise that something is amiss in international political
theory but, in contrast to numerous recent works, aims to provide more than a
eulogy, lament, or nostalgic retrospective on the field. Instead, it seeks to get at the
root cause of the problem.
I argue that the perennial malaise of international theory is a problem of
discipline, in both the ordinary and scientific sense. First, the field is in the grip of
unprecedented theoretical tumult, its practitioners in danger of drifting out of
familiar currents into a boundless sea of relativism. Second, the scientific status of
the discourse remains an issue of concern to many scholars. But the first group of
"theorists" promise us little more than diversity, while the second look for
theoretical shelter in the false haven of empirical science. The crisis of
international theory is thus inflamed by a misrepresented debate in which either
too much emphasis is placed on consensus, or too great a virtue made of
difference. Returning to the insights of E. H. Carr, I reconceptualize the problem of
theoretical consensus in international relations as an issue that is inherently
irresolvable and, at the same time, workable.
The thesis argues against the view that international relations cannot
achieve secure status as a discipline without attaining, or at least aspiring to
construct, a global empirical theory. Following Carr, I argue that there are deep and
enduring differences in international theory, differences that can always be
counted on to undermine the "panacea of a global explanatory theory"
(Hoffmann, 1960). These differences are traced, via Carr, to a basic antithesis
deriving from the contrasting requirements and standards of normative and
empirical theory. By the same token, however, I argue that differences that are
irreconcilable on their own theoretical terms can be reconciled within the broader
ambit of discipline, provided that the latter is understood as a community of
scholars united by basic human interests — the avoidance of war for example — and
not as a field of study amenable to the canons of science.
To demonstrate the argument, I undertake a study of neoliberalism,
focusing in particular on international regimes. I focus on neoliberalism because it
is the heir apparent to realism, and on regime theorists because of their explicit
attempt to reconcile idealist and realist perspectives. My critique of these
approaches concentrates on their open agenda to synthesize realist and liberal
international theory. I conclude that regime theory, as it is conceived by
neoliberals, disguises, but ultimately founders, on the irreconcilable theoretical
differences identified by Carr.
|
|---|
