| Summary: | Governments across Canada face increasing demands for public involvement in resource
management decision-making, particularly at local levels. At the centre of debate are three issues:
(a) the distribution of decision-making authority and responsibility; (b) the distributions of costs and
benefits; and (c) the question of sustainability (ecological, social, and economic) at local levels. In
the face ofthis wide range of often conflicting interests involving many non-aboriginal stakeholders
on one hand, and First Nations on the other, governments want less conflict and believe that they can
achieve this through more collaboration or co-management agreements. In particular, governments
suspect that both groups above can share in the management decisions and responsibilities of the line
agencies responsible for land use and resource management.
This thesis uses two cases to investigate the effects of co-management on: the delegation of
decision-making authority to local levels; the substance of resource management decisions; social
relationships among various actors; and conflict resolution. The two cases, which are both located
in Temagami, northeastern Ontario, are the Comprehensive Planning Council (CPC) and the
Wendaban Stewardship Authority (WSA). The theoretical framework of the study includes co
management, democratic theory and its applications in citizen participation, and conflict resolution
and its relationship to the theory of communicative action. Data collection methods involved semi
structured interviews with members of both agencies, the local public, and key informants.
Documentary sources included minutes, administrative documents, letters, memoranda, government
reports, news briefs, and newsclippings pertaining to both co-management agencies. Transient
observation was also used in data collection. The study employed content analysis and ‘pattern
matching’ as the main analytic strategies. The results of this study show that the decentralization models of co-management agreements
examined did not delegate decision-making authority to local levels. While one lacked the authority
to effectively advise and influence the decisions of the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), the
other lacked the authority to implement its own decisions. Ultimately, the authority to make and
implement decisions rested with the MNR. Generally, the substance of resource management
decisions under co-management improved over those made in the past by the MNR, However, the
sustainability and equitability of those decisions could not be tested because the MNR, rather than
the two co-management agencies, retained both the responsibility and authority to implement those
decisions. Therefore, in the absence ofdejure authority by the two agencies to advise/make and
implement decisions, the quality of the substance of decisions under co-management could not be
determined.
The levels of public participation in both agencies’ planning and decision-making processes,
and the lack of involvement by stakeholder groups in the selection of members to the two co
management agencies, influenced social relationships among actors in co-management. This selection
was the exclusive domain of the government. Both theoretical propositions of co-management and
citizen participation fail to explicitly discuss the quality of information and methods used as important
attributes in effective public participation. While consensus decision-making and land-use zoning
technique facilitated conflict resolution in the second case, consensus decision-making was lacking
in the first case. In addition, the MNR conducted land-use zoning without the involvement of both
local publics and the citizens’ group that it was supposed to share decisions with; thus, exacerbating
local conflicts among them. Both practical and theoretical implications of this study findings are
discussed.
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