| Summary: | The object of this thesis is to cast a new light on
Locke’s distinction between ideas of mixed modes and those
of substances. The particular interest here is in Locke’s
frequent remarks about the “arbitrariness” of ideas of mixed
modes and the “non—arbitrariness” of ideas of substances.
To develop a
satisfactory account of the arbitrariness
and non—arbitrariness of ideas, I
take note of the fact
that, in explaining the reality of ideas, Locke utilizes the
difference in the manner in which the two types of complex
ideas are made. Particularly, his remark that ideas of
substances are all made in reference to actual things is
considered.
It will be seen, then, that to “refer” a complex idea
to actual things is to suppose the conformity between the
idea and them, and also that the “conformity” in this case
is understood as the correspondence between the set of
qualities specified by that idea and a set of qualities in
nature or as the coexistence of such a set in nature. The
arbitrariness and non—arbitrariness of the two types of
complex ideas is thus explained in terms of the manners in
which these ideas are made: while the formation of ideas of
substances is propositional in nature, the formation of
those of mixed modes is not.
Furthermore, Locke’s distinction between ideas and
propositions in terms of truth and falsity implies that the
reference to actual things is extrinsic to our ideas. Hence,
I shall conclude that, for Locke, the difference between
ideas of mixed modes and those of substances is
characterized as this: that as a contingent fact, ideas of
substances are formed in reference to actual things whereas
those of mixed modes are not.
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