| Summary: | The question What kinds of things are morally important in
themselves? (People? All sentient creatures? Trees? All living things? Ecosystems? Mountains? Rivers? Pebbles? Old cans?) is pressing. Thanks to 'animal rights' activism, the abortion debate, environmentalism, and a sense that technology needs greater moral guidance, analytic philosophy now offers four broad answers: HUMANISM (all and only humans), SENTIENTISM (all creatures capable of 'affect'), VITALISM
(all individual living organisms) , and ECOSOPHISM (all living individuals plus some natural 'systems' and, perhaps, certain nonliving natural entities).
These answers are carefully developed and contain many persuasive elements. However, critical exploration of representative literature reveals that each answer is predicated on a distinct and different
view of morality's purpose, and we are rationally free to reject any
(or all) of those views. In consequence, debate stalls. Short of
question-begging appeals to first principles, the positions fall back
on touting their relative merits. The best we can say is that humanists extending consideration to all humans will face difficulty resisting sentientism, but even sentientism is not rationally incumbent. Once we look beyond life-forms to whom events can matter in
some way, expansionist arguments clearly fail to speak to humanist (and sentientist) concerns. Because humanism (and, to a lesser extent, sentientism) is informed by longstanding tradition, a considerable
burden of proof impedes expansionist ambitions. The expansionist programme requires finding common ground; ground which is not obviously in evidence. To conclude, I offer an explicitly tentative suggestion for beginning to resolve this impasse. All
parties should agree that whatever else morality does (or does not) achieve, rational morality promotes human well-being. And it is
abundantly clear that human well-being requires a healthy, sustainable
environment. Thus, an instrumental, pragmatic, approach to framing
moral requirements seems to offer grounds for moral expansion. But can
this essentially anthropocentric view of morality and environmentalism be used to determine what kinds of things are morally
important in themselves? Separating our reasoning about morality from
situated moral reasoning per se, reveals reason to think the approach
can and will support a vitalist, or even ecosophist, account of moral
scope.
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