Desert, equality and justice

• Main Author: Kalmansson, Jón Ásgeir
• Language: English
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/3842

In this essay I argue that pre-institutional desert is relevant to the notion of distributive justice. My argument is in two main parts. First I show how the notion of pre institutional desert can be given sufficient grounding. I argue that there is a clear distinction between desert and entitlement. Desert, unlike entitlement, is not created by satisfying certain conditions laid down in a system of rules or regulations. Thus, desert is a natural moral notion, prior to institutions and rules, and a standard by which such institutions and rules may be judged. Second, I show how conceptions of distributive justice which exclude pre-institutional desert, in particular the theories of John Rawls, Ronald Dwarkin and Thomas Nagel, are mistaken. Rawls' main objection to the pre-institutional conception of desert is that desert claims are always ultimately based on circumstances or characteristics over which the agent has no control, and are therefore morally arbitrary. My main response to this is to deny that moral value is beyond all luck. Moral agents, although never in control "all the way down", may properly be morally evaluated for characteristics which they have not voluntarily acquired, in particular if these characteristics are combined with effort or contribution. According to egalitarians such as Dworkin and Nagel, each person's life matters equally, and hence everyone should get an equal share of the community's resources. This view conflicts with the differentiations imposed by desert. My main criticism of the egalitarian doctrine is that it unreasonably assumes that each person's life has equal moral value because impersonal value is somehow the predominant consideration in the evaluation of a person's human worth. I argue that, on the contrary, the importance of a person's life cannot be evaluated without reference to the greater or lesser value that person has for others. A plausible account of moral worth must bring together the impartial, and the partial value of the person. Thus, I conclude that even from the standpoint of politics, the interests of members of the community do not matter equally.