| Summary: | Preventive strikes on nuclear facilities have been considered in
perhaps ten cases since World War II. The continued proliferation of nuclear
weapons means that there remains a variety of potential targets for
preventive strikes, including countries such as Iran and Libya, launched by
countries like the United States and Israel; this paper explores whether
such military action against new weapons programs is in fact probable.
The answer to this question is pursued through a comparison of the past
cases where preventive strikes were under discussion. All share certain
common features, but eight factors tend to distinguish instances where
preventive strikes were carried out from the majority in which they were
rejected. Significant support and little protest were expected when
preventive strikes were engaged in. In turn, the prospect of operational
success, defined in terms of destroying all relevant nuclear facilities in
the target, was predictably worst where military action was not carried out.
The degree and immediacy of threat were also depicted as more pronounced in
the case of realized preventive strikes. Of course, perceptions of this
kind are malleable; additional factors came into play. States which
launched preventive strikes had few other options for dealing with the
unwanted proliferator, and had the opportunity to destroy its nuclear
facilities while they were still under construction (or, for other reasons,
not in operation). With their eye on these kinds of factors, countries
seemed to be deterred from undertaking military action when it would
blatantly infringe upon international law. Furthermore, states were less
inclined to act when faced with military retaliation by the target, and
when, correspondingly, domestic public opinion promised to be unfavorable.
Using this list of criteria for guidance, it will be concluded that
preventive strikes are unlikely to occur in the near future.
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