| Summary: | In this dissertation I am concerned with 3 objectives:
(1) To determine the nature of India's security dilemma in Kashmir.
(2) To show that the Indo-Pakistan commitment to the nuclear weapons option
makes it imperative that conflict management is augmented by mechanisms of
conflict resolution.
(3) To proffer a solution to the crisis that will address the structural constraints
of the Indo-Pakistan "insecurity complex" and account for the internal and
external causes of the present imbroglio.
First, I shall argue that Kashmir poses a dual internal-external security
problem for India. The internal component of threat which involves the rising
tide of militant Kashmiri ethno-nationalism, and its cries for separation from the
Indian union, has been caused by two factors: the steady erosion of the nation's
democratic, federal, and secular edifice, and New Delhi's continued neglect of the
state's socio-economic needs. I contend that as Indian security forces become
mired in a counter-insurgency war against Kashmiri militants, it appears that New
Delhi is unwittingly aiding and abetting the very process of fragmentation that she
so desperately wants to prevent These internal security problems have been
compounded by Pakistan's irredentist claims and actions in Kashmir. The
external component of threat involving Pakistan's covert support of disaffected
elements in the troubled state has thus sustained the conflict
Second, I shall determine the prospects for a fourth Indo-Pakistan war
involving Kashmir as the bone of contention. I maintain that the risks of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan are greater than deterrence advocates suggest
because of the political dynamics which obtain and the weaknesses of the
command, control, communication and information systems in both countries. To
illustrate this point, I shall examine the causes of the May 1990 confrontation
between India and Pakistan in which escalation to a nuclear level was quite
possible.
Finally, I shall argue that a window of opportunity has been created in the
international context of the 1990s in which the conditions for dispute resolution
depend upon the reformation of the Indian and Pakistani systems of domestic
governance. The most effective way to check centrifugal tendencies unleashed by
the assertion of sub-national loyalties is to rejuvenate Indian democracy,
federalism and secularism. In order to reverse the pattern of enmity that has
historically structured Indo-Pakistan relations, Pakistan must endeavor to
restructure and rethink its political institutions and political practises. Pakistan
must keep the psychology of the military out of civilian governance, develop a
polity that is more "federal" in character, and improve the standard of living for
the masses. In short, once both countries put their domestic houses in order, one
can envisage an end to the crisis in Kashmir.
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