| Summary: | The Ethic of Care began as a theory of moral development, but many have accepted it as if
it were a normative moral theory, either alone or in conjunction with the Ethic of Justice. This
project determines whether or not the Ethic of Care actually can constitute a comprehensive
moral theory.
I begin with the history of the development of the Ethic of Care. I then examine the
widely-held view that moral relations are freely-chosen contractual agreements occurring between
rational equals in order to manage the problem of public competition of interests and to protect
individual rights. I suggest that this view of morality, its associated moral theory, the Ethic of
Justice, and its criterion of impartiality do not represent the totality of moral experience and they
mandate unpalatable outcomes in some private moral situations.
As a result, I contend that the impartiality requirement should not be a criterion for
judging the adequacy of a theory governing personal (private) moral relations. I suggest a list of
appropriate criteria and compare the Ethic of Care with the list in order to determine whether it
can act as a theory governing this realm. I argue that the Ethic of Care is a theory of personal
morality, that the Ethic of Justice is a theory of impersonal morality, and that the quest for a
comprehensive moral theory that accounts for the totality of moral relations must integrate these
two perspectives in a way that overcomes the problem of prioritization. Various integration
options from the current philosophical literature are explained and rejected before I provide my
own account of how the Ethic of Care and the Ethic of Justice can interact, together providing a
comprehensive moral theory capable of guiding action for the entire range of moral relations.
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