| Summary: | In this thesis, I argue that P.F. Strawson seriously underestimates the controversial
nature of the beliefs and attitudes of which the retributive reactive attitudes (RAs) often
involve. Although he acknowledges that the RAs involve a "seamy side," he fails to admit
they frequently commit the reactive person to psychological, if not metaphysical, beliefs that
violate principles of impartiality and rationality. As we shall, this is important in the
dialectical context of "Freedom and Resentment", because Strawson's goal of reconciling the
compatibilists and incompatibilists about moral responsibility requires the RAs to be free of
such controversial presuppositions. I argue that because more modest versions of "seamy"
retributive RAs are grounded in false and egoistic beliefs, the incompatibilist will remain
skeptical that the gap in consequentialist compatibilism can be filled by the won-metaphysical
fact of our "natural proneness" to take up the reactive stance
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