| Summary: | Fictional characters pose interesting questions both to metaphysics and philosophy of language. We appear to have two incompatible intuitions about fictional characters: 1) fictional characters are created and 2) fictional characters are nonexistent. To say something is created is to say that it exists. However, to say that fictional characters are nonexistent, suggests that they are not created. Various theories attempt to explain the ontological status of fictional characters based on one of these intuitions. Once a theory is adopted, a subsequent concern is how that theory might identify individual fictional characters. I investigate two such proposals that are based on our second intuition. I argue that these attempts are uncharitably criticized because they have not been fully developed. I develop these attempts further to show how they can withstand previous criticisms. However, in doing so, I expose other problems faced by these attempts that appears to genuinely lead to their demise.
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