Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market

Submitted by Ricardo Barros de Aquino Fonseca (ricardobafonseca@gmail.com) on 2017-06-28T06:01:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) === Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.b...

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Main Author: Fonseca, Ricardo Barros de Aquino
Other Authors: Sant'Anna, Marcelo Castello Branco
Language:English
Published: 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18413
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spelling ndltd-IBICT-oai-bibliotecadigital.fgv.br-10438-184132019-01-21T17:38:16Z Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market Fonseca, Ricardo Barros de Aquino Sant'Anna, Marcelo Castello Branco Castro, Rudi Rocha de Escolas::EPGE FGV Trindade, André Health insurance market Discrete-choice models Asymmetric information Brazil Saúde Seguro-saúde - Brasil Informação assimétrica Processo decisório Submitted by Ricardo Barros de Aquino Fonseca (ricardobafonseca@gmail.com) on 2017-06-28T06:01:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2017-06-30T12:38:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-04T18:13:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-28 I test for the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection in the Brazilian health insurance market. I use the positive correlation test, proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000), to assess the existence of asymmetric information in this market. I estimate the effect of health plan on treatment usage, controlling for many variables (measured blood pressure, age, smoker, etc.), identifying the effect of the plan. I use this coefficients as plan characteristics and estimate their effects on plan purchase using a simple logit regression. The coefficients from this estimation show the relative importance of anticipated moral hazard of different treatments on health plan choice. I find evidence of asymmetric information in the market for every state, in either the Metropolitan Area or not, and for the country as a whole. When performing the positive correlation test using hospitalizations as the usage variable, where moral hazard is assumed to be controlled, I find this evidence only for young women and for the last age group (59 years or more). I find no evidence of asymmetric information for plans paid through work, as expected. Several treatments are used more by people with plans, even when controlling for adverse selection. The analysis suggests that some of those are relevant for plan purchase. 2017-07-04T18:13:40Z 2017-07-04T18:13:40Z 2017-03-28 info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis FONSECA, Ricardo Barros de Aquino. Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18413 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas instacron:FGV
collection NDLTD
language English
sources NDLTD
topic Health insurance market
Discrete-choice models
Asymmetric information
Brazil
Saúde
Seguro-saúde - Brasil
Informação assimétrica
Processo decisório
spellingShingle Health insurance market
Discrete-choice models
Asymmetric information
Brazil
Saúde
Seguro-saúde - Brasil
Informação assimétrica
Processo decisório
Fonseca, Ricardo Barros de Aquino
Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market
description Submitted by Ricardo Barros de Aquino Fonseca (ricardobafonseca@gmail.com) on 2017-06-28T06:01:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) === Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2017-06-30T12:38:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) === Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-04T18:13:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo_Fonseca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1923906 bytes, checksum: 31859d5e2f131b25276d0fc435835757 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-28 === I test for the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection in the Brazilian health insurance market. I use the positive correlation test, proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000), to assess the existence of asymmetric information in this market. I estimate the effect of health plan on treatment usage, controlling for many variables (measured blood pressure, age, smoker, etc.), identifying the effect of the plan. I use this coefficients as plan characteristics and estimate their effects on plan purchase using a simple logit regression. The coefficients from this estimation show the relative importance of anticipated moral hazard of different treatments on health plan choice. I find evidence of asymmetric information in the market for every state, in either the Metropolitan Area or not, and for the country as a whole. When performing the positive correlation test using hospitalizations as the usage variable, where moral hazard is assumed to be controlled, I find this evidence only for young women and for the last age group (59 years or more). I find no evidence of asymmetric information for plans paid through work, as expected. Several treatments are used more by people with plans, even when controlling for adverse selection. The analysis suggests that some of those are relevant for plan purchase.
author2 Sant'Anna, Marcelo Castello Branco
author_facet Sant'Anna, Marcelo Castello Branco
Fonseca, Ricardo Barros de Aquino
author Fonseca, Ricardo Barros de Aquino
author_sort Fonseca, Ricardo Barros de Aquino
title Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market
title_short Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market
title_full Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market
title_fullStr Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market
title_full_unstemmed Informational frictions in the Brazilian health insurance market
title_sort informational frictions in the brazilian health insurance market
publishDate 2017
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18413
work_keys_str_mv AT fonsecaricardobarrosdeaquino informationalfrictionsinthebrazilianhealthinsurancemarket
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