Essays on competition and returns of inside money

Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T15:53:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2003-12-22 === In an early paper, Cavalcanti and Wallace (2001) showed, using a computable version of Cavalcanti-Wallace model (CW-1999), that optimal regulation induces banks to pay interests, inste...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Forno, Henrique Dezemone
Other Authors: Escolas::EPGE
Language:English
Published: 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10438/1060
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Summary:Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T15:53:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2003-12-22 === In an early paper, Cavalcanti and Wallace (2001) showed, using a computable version of Cavalcanti-Wallace model (CW-1999), that optimal regulation induces banks to pay interests, instead of contracting the money supply in an inside money allocation. Here, we generalize CW in two fashions, assuming inside money allocations, so that banks are supposed to issue money as they find a potential producer wishing to produce. The first generalization allows for seasonality due to real shocks on preferences with persistence and for monetary policy improvement. We found an asymmetric path for interest rates when constraints matter, even when shocks are independent. The second generalization allows for bank competition, in the sense that banks can choose between two different banking nets. We proof the existence of simple stable and unstable equilibria and also verify the existence of multiple equilibria.