Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content

Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content

Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are (1) phenomenally conscious, (2) spontaneous, (3) and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositiona...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: McGahhey, Marcus
Format: Others
Published: ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 2016
Subjects:
Intuitions
Thought Experiments
Intuitive Content
Interpretation
Online Access:http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/188
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=philosophy_theses
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spelling ndltd-GEORGIA-oai-scholarworks.gsu.edu-philosophy_theses-11942016-05-26T15:34:03Z Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content McGahhey, Marcus Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are (1) phenomenally conscious, (2) spontaneous, (3) and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositionalists claim that intuitions (4) bear consciously accessible propositional content. The negative project of this essay is a critique of (4), the rejection of which is tantamount to rejecting Propositionalism. In addition, I propose an alternative position – namely, Interpretationalism. According to Interpretationalism, intuitions possess the features ascribed in (1)-(3); however, they do not bear consciously accessible propositional content. Instead, intuitions acquire cognitive significance by virtue of being interpreted in light of a subject’s background beliefs. 2016-08-12T07:00:00Z text application/pdf http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/188 http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=philosophy_theses Philosophy Theses ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Intuitions Thought Experiments Intuitive Content Interpretation
collection NDLTD
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Intuitions
Thought Experiments
Intuitive Content
Interpretation
spellingShingle Intuitions
Thought Experiments
Intuitive Content
Interpretation
McGahhey, Marcus
Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content
description Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are (1) phenomenally conscious, (2) spontaneous, (3) and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositionalists claim that intuitions (4) bear consciously accessible propositional content. The negative project of this essay is a critique of (4), the rejection of which is tantamount to rejecting Propositionalism. In addition, I propose an alternative position – namely, Interpretationalism. According to Interpretationalism, intuitions possess the features ascribed in (1)-(3); however, they do not bear consciously accessible propositional content. Instead, intuitions acquire cognitive significance by virtue of being interpreted in light of a subject’s background beliefs.
author McGahhey, Marcus
author_facet McGahhey, Marcus
author_sort McGahhey, Marcus
title Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content
title_short Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content
title_full Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content
title_fullStr Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content
title_full_unstemmed Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content
title_sort thought experiments and the myth of intuitive content
publisher ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
publishDate 2016
url http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/188
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=philosophy_theses
work_keys_str_mv AT mcgahheymarcus thoughtexperimentsandthemythofintuitivecontent
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