Dworkinian Liberalism & Gay Rights: A Defense of Same-Sex Relations

• Main Author: Bui, Ngoc Quang H.
• Format: Others
• Published: Digital Archive @ GSU 2010
• Subjects: queer studies; LGBT; right to privacy; gender studies; constitutional law; philosophy of Law; Philosophy
• Online Access: http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/71; http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=philosophy_theses

Recent changes in the politics of gay rights have led to a gay rights demand for liberal governments: i) decriminalization of sodomy and ii) full governmental recognition of civil, same-sex marriages. Challengers to liberalism argue that a neutral liberalism cannot satisfy the gay rights demand. I argue that the liberal political framework put forth by Ronald Dworkin can adequately fulfill the gay rights demand. Dworkinian liberalism, which is neutral with respect to the ethical life, need not be neutral with respect to moral and non-ethical values. I argue for the more modest claim that Dworkinian liberalism has the conceptual tools and principles for satisfying the gay rights demand. In arguing for my claim, I discuss the internal criticisms of Carlos Ball and Michael Sandel and the external criticism of John Finnis. I argue that these concerns are surmountable. Dworkinian liberalism is capable of offering a robust defense of same-sex relations.