The Non-moral Basis of Cognitive Biases of Moral Intuitions

• Main Author: Thomas, Bradley Charles
• Format: Others
• Published: Digital Archive @ GSU 2008
• Subjects: Experimental Philosophy; Moral Psychology; Metaethics; Moral Epistemology; Moral intuitionism; Philosophy
• Online Access: http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/44; http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=philosophy_theses

Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism. As such, I attempt to show that the renewed argument is subject to an analogous objection as the old one; many cognitive biases of moral intuitions result from biases of non-moral judgments. Thus, the unreliability of moral intuitions due to biases (and the reason inferential justification was required) can be removed by clearing up the non-moral biases. Accordingly, biases of moral intuitions do not threaten a slightly qualified version intuitionism which posits non-inferential justification of intuitions when non-moral biases are not present. I also present an empirical study that lends initial support to my argument.