A complex networks approach to designing resilient system-of-systems

• Main Author: Tran, Huy T.
• Other Authors: Mavris, Dimitri
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: Georgia Institute of Technology 2016
• Subjects: System-of-systems; Complex networks; Resilient systems; Resilience; Response surface methodology; Linear regression
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/54384

This thesis develops a methodology for designing resilient system-of-systems (SoS) networks. This methodology includes a capability-based resilience assessment framework, used to quantify SoS resilience. A complex networks approach is used to generate potential SoS network designs, focusing on scale-free and random network topologies, degree-based and random rewiring adaptation, and targeted and random node removal threats. Statistical design methods, specifically response surface methodology, are used to evaluate SoS networks and provide an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of potential designs. Linear regression is used to model a continuous representation of the network design space, and determine optimally resilient networks for particular threat types. The methodology is applied to an information exchange (IE) network model (i.e., a message passing network model) and military command and control (C2) model. Results show that optimally resilient IE network topologies are random for networks with adaptation, regardless of the threat type. However, the optimally resilient adaptation method sharply transitions from being fully random to fully degree-based as threat randomness increases. These findings suggest that intermediately defined networks should not be considered when designing for resilience. Cost-benefit analysis of C2 networks suggests that resilient C2 networks are more cost-effective than robust ones, as long as the cost of rewiring network links is less than three-fourths the cost of creating new links. This result identifies a threshold for which a resilient network design approach is more cost-effective than a robust one.This thesis develops a methodology for designing resilient system-of-systems (SoS) networks. This methodology includes a capability-based resilience assessment framework, used to quantify SoS resilience. A complex networks approach is used to generate potential SoS network designs, focusing on scale-free and random network topologies, degree-based and random rewiring adaptation, and targeted and random node removal threats. Statistical design methods, specifically response surface methodology, are used to evaluate SoS networks and provide an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of potential designs. Linear regression is used to model a continuous representation of the network design space, and determine optimally resilient networks for particular threat types. The methodology is applied to an information exchange (IE) network model (i.e., a message passing network model) and military command and control (C2) model. Results show that optimally resilient IE network topologies are random for networks with adaptation, regardless of the threat type. However, the optimally resilient adaptation method sharply transitions from being fully random to fully degree-based as threat randomness increases. These findings suggest that intermediately defined networks should not be considered when designing for resilience. Cost-benefit analysis of C2 networks suggests that resilient C2 networks are more cost-effective than robust ones, as long as the cost of rewiring network links is less than three-fourths the cost of creating new links. This result identifies a threshold for which a resilient network design approach is more cost-effective than a robust one.