Hardware-assisted security: bloom cache – scalable low-overhead control flow integrity checking

• Main Author: Young, Vinson
• Other Authors: Kim, Jongman
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: Georgia Institute of Technology 2015
• Subjects: Security; Bloom filter; Control flow hijacking; Memory; Control flow integrity
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/53994

Computers were not built with security in mind. As such, security has and still often takes a back seat to performance. However, in an era where there is so much sensitive data being stored, with cloud storage and huge customer databases, much has to be done to keep this data safe from intruders. Control flow hijacking attacks, stemming from a basic code injection attack to return-into-libc and other code re-use attacks, are among the most dangerous attacks. Currently available solutions, like Data execution prevention that can prevent a user from executing writable pages to prevent code injection attacks, do not have an efficient solution for protecting against code re-use attacks, which can execute valid code in a malicious order. To protect against control flow hijacking attacks, this work proposes architecture to make Control Flow Integrity, a solution that proposes to validate control flow against pre-computed control flow graph, practical. Current implementations of Control Flow Integrity have problems with code modularity, performance, or scalability, so I propose Dynamic Bloom Cache, a blocked-Bloom-filter-based approach, to solve current implementation issues.