Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information
<p>This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about...
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2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10161/5652 |
| Summary: | <p>This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.</p> === Dissertation |
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