Do trained actors learn strategic behaviour or are they selected into their positions?

• Main Author: Berger, Roger
• Other Authors: Universität Leip, Institut für Sozioloige
• Format: Others
• Language: English
• Published: Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig 2014
• Subjects: Minimax; Min-Max-Theorem; untrainierte Akteure; Lernen; Fußball; Elfmeter; Auswahl; untrained actors; soccer; penalty kick; learning; selection; ddc:302; ddc:796
• Online Access: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-149526; http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-149526; http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/14952/60%2C%20Berger.pdf

This paper studies if the Minimax theorem holds for the behaviour of trained and untrained actors in the field. This is explored with data from 1043 football penalty kicks from professionals of the German Bundesliga and for 268 penalty kicks from untrained players. Minimax makes good predictions about the collective patterns emerging from the behaviour of experienced actors, as well as about their individual strategic actions. However, this is not true for untrained actors. In the next step it is explored if, the professional players learned their behaviour, or if they were selected into their roles because they had the required abilities. The data suggests that the professionals were selected by the competitive conditions of professional sports.