The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

• Main Author: Hiller, Tobias
• Other Authors: Molecular Diversity Preservation International (MDPI),
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden 2018
• Subjects: ausgeschlossene Koalitionen; Streit; φE-Wert; Shapley-Wert; kooperative Spieltheorie; TU Dresden; Publikationsfond; excluded coalitions; quarreling; φE value; Shapley value; cooperative game theory; Publishing Fund; ddc:510; rvk:SA 1075
• Online Access: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-232165; http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-232165; http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/23216/games-09-00001.pdf

One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φE value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.