高階經理人之選擇權與公司績效之關聯性研究

• Main Author: 黎劭儀
• Language: 英文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 員工選擇權; 公司績效; 誘因調整; 利益榨取; Employee stock option; Firm performance; Incentive alignment; Rent extraction
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0923530021%22.

本研究主要探討高階經理人之選擇權與公司績效之關聯性，研究發現，公司發給高階經理人之選擇權價值與Tobin’s Q呈正向關係。為區分誘因調整（the incentive alignment perspective）與利益榨取（the rent extraction perspective）兩觀點，本研究將選擇權預測值分為經濟因素、公司治理與殘值三部分。研究結果顯示依據經濟因素所預測出之選擇權價值與Tobin’s Q呈正向關係，其符合誘因調整觀點，即發放選擇權可減少代理問題。而依公司治理所預測出之選擇權價值，則與Tobin’s Q 呈負向關係，此亦與利益榨取觀點相符，即當公司治理較差時，發給高階經理人之選擇權往往較股東最適程度為高。此外，本研究亦發現選擇權與Tobin’s Q有一非線性關係。 === This study examines the association between employee stock options (ESOs) and future firm performance (Tobin’s Q). The evidence shows that the value of ESOs granted to CEOs in the current and past five years are positively associated with Tobin’s Q. To test the incentive alignment perspective and the rent extraction perspective, this study predicts the value of ESOs granted to CEOs due to economic determinants, governance quality and residual value. I find that the predicted component of ESO grants due to economic determinants are positively related with Tobin’s Q, consistent with the incentive alignment perspective that ESOs are granted to reduce the agency problem. Further, the predicted component of ESO grants attributable to the governance factors are negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, indicating that for firms with poor governance, the actual level of incentives executives receive may go well beyond the optimal level for shareholders. The negative association is consistent with the rent extraction perspective. Moreover, this study also finds a non-linear association between the Tobin’s Q and the ESO grant values.