不願面對的真相：阿爾比《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中的倫理關係

• Main Authors: 吳梅祥, Wu, Mei Hsiang
• Language: 英文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 阿爾比; 誰怕吳爾芙; 列維納斯; 倫理關係; 整體性暴力; Albee; <i>Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?</i>; Levinas; ethical relationship; totalizing violence
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0915510102%22.

本論文以列維納斯(Emmanuel Levinas)早期的著作《整體與無限》(Totality and Infinity)為啟蒙探討其倫理思想所提倡的他者哲學，進而分析阿爾比《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中的倫理關係(ethical relationship)。列氏試圖顛覆古典哲學以降的本體論霸權，並提倡他者哲學為第一哲學。論文第二章以列氏思想對於西方哲學傳統的批判為主調，揭開整體性(totality)或本體論(ontology)之暴力性。列氏反思與抨擊西方哲學淪於以自我為中心的自我學(egology)並泛稱其為本體論。本體論中對於他者的認知往往是藉由一個中立的詞來化約他者為同者。同者把他者當成一個主題或客體的展現以便理解或掌握他者；他者在此認知過程中被納入同者的整體當中，因此他者在黑格爾辯證法中被否定為「非我」；他者甚至被同化為「另一個我」；海德格式本體論獨尊存有(Being)的同時，與他者的關係被矮化為廣泛的存有關係。藉由否定、同化等手法，他者被化約為「非我」、「另一個我」以及存有的一部份，並納入同者的整體範疇當中。在《誰怕吳爾芙？》劇中同者對於他者的整體性暴力(totalizing violence)化約過程透過數個例子可一窺其究竟。第一例為同者對他者的「化約」：瑪莎所講述的拳擊故事中，瑪莎父親要求喬治與其對打，呈現出瑪莎父親欲強迫喬治接受其所定義的男子氣概形象。第二例為同者對他者的「同化」：尼克所影射的遺傳學工程願景中，人人被創造為同一模樣，透露出同者欲同化他者的野心。第三例為同者對他者的「否定」：瑪莎刻意與尼克發生性關係來激怒喬治，並否定喬治的男人尊嚴。第三章著重於尼克與蜜糖的來訪所帶來的影響，如同他者的出現般，要求喬治與瑪莎做出回應。在列氏倫理中，他者與同者的關係乃是一種「離開」(separation)的狀態。唯有在此「離開」的狀態中，他者的激進他異性(the alterity of the Other)方成可能。他者的激進他異性使他者不會落入同者的整體性暴力之中，讓他者成為絕對他者並延伸出他者的無限性。他者的臉龐(face)，或可稱為他者在這世上所留下的痕跡(trace)，向我呼喚並索求倫理責任。在此劇中，尼克與蜜糖的出現猶如他者的出現般震撼了喬治與瑪莎的幻想世界。喬治與瑪莎虛構自己生了一個兒子來滿足他們現實生活中的失望與空虛，就像列氏倫理所描述他者未出現前，同者在其所處的外在世界中找到有別於自我的物質，並賴以生存所產生的喜悅般，這虛構的孩子對喬治和瑪莎而言，是他們私密幻想世界中最大的幸福喜悅與慰藉寄託。但因瑪莎過於沉溺在自我幻想世界之中，不小心在蜜糖面前將兩人虛構的孩子說溜嘴而惹喬治生氣。虛構的孩子永遠不會變成真人，也無法擁有列氏所提出的他者的激進他異性；尼克與蜜糖的來訪猶如他者的降臨般，使得喬治與瑪莎私密幻想世界中虛構出來的孩子，一旦公開後卻成為現實生活中互相爭執的核心。在瑪莎宣稱她結婚的意義是不斷地鞭打折磨喬治時，喬治才終於領悟到瑪莎真的生病了而且病得不輕。更重要的是，瑪莎的不貞與其背後所表現出帶有毀滅性的整體性暴力迫使喬治做出回應。瑪莎的不道德行為喚醒了喬治自身對於瑪莎的責任與使命感。基於對瑪莎深刻的愛與關懷，喬治做出殺掉心愛虛構孩子之沉痛決定。喬治的動機絕對不是為了報復瑪莎，而是以拯救瑪莎為出發點，避免她繼續墮入這極端的整體性暴力。第四章為本論文的終章；透過數個例子(尤其是瑪莎的通姦)，解析列氏所批判的本體論式整體性暴力之多重面貌，本篇論文指出喬治對瑪莎的深切關懷，恰恰實現列氏倫理思想中的他者哲學，正是一種為他人著想的哲學。 === This thesis examines the totalizing violence overrunning in Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and a call for responsibility to and for the Other in Emmanuel Levinas's propositions of ethical relationship. In this play, the illusion of life can also be counted as an inconvenient truth, yet the playwright urges people to acknowledge the difference between illusion and reality. George and Martha build their marriage on a life game, their imagined son. When Nick and Honey arrive, an interrelation between private and public and illusion and reality disturbs all four characters. Martha's totalizing indulgence goes into extremes when she is lost in her fantasy world gradually and commits adultery deliberately. Sensing the seriousness of Martha's situation, George finally wakes up from his own illusion and decides to kill the imagined son for Martha's sake. It is an act of profound love and care that George dispels the illusion in his and Martha's marriage life. Chapter Two examines different forms of ontology, which is embodied by the three major philosophical systems: I and not-I in the Hegelian dialectic, ego and alter ego, and the Heideggerian primacy of Being and then demonstrates various examples of the totalizing violence through the reduction of Martha's father, the symbolic assimilation of Nick, and, particularly, the destructive negation of Martha. Committing adultery is an extreme manner to claim one’s power. George's reaction to Martha's ethical transgression is crucial. Chapter Three explores one's responsibility to and for the Other in the ethical relationship between self and other and argues that George’s decision of killing the imagined son reflects Levinas's ethical concern. Recognizing his own alienation from society and deciding to take the responsibility to help Martha eliminate her internalized ontological violence, George fully represents Levinas's concept of responsibility to and for the Other. A dialogue of Albee's dramatic text and Levinas's propositions highlight the importance of ethical relationship between self and other on a genuine basis. Through their works about violence and compassion, both Albee and Levinas have high concern for the Other.