員工分紅費用化及企業所可能採取的因應措施對股東及員工權益影響之研究

• Main Authors: 陳振中, Chen, Chen Chung
• Language: 中文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 員工分紅; 員工分紅費用化; 股東權益; 員工權益; employee stock bonus; employee stock bonus being expensed; shareholders' equity; employees' income
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0913590351%22.

自2001年以來，美國爆發安隆、世界通訊等一連串的弊案後，國際性投資機構法人不斷對財務會計報表是否能真實、允當的表達一家公司經營的面貌產生未有的質疑，其中包括國內實施多年的員工分紅配股制度，在此期間，國內主管機關、產業界及學術界針對此制度所衍伸的問題有相當多的討論與交換意見。 本研究觀察2004~2006年國內員工分紅配股現況；探討員工分紅配股屬盈餘分配情況下，在目前會計處理所衍伸的公司治理及會計原則適用問題；並參考馬秀如教授於會計研究月刊所舉的例子，加以延伸，加入更多參數及假設條件，探討員工分紅配股依面額或依市價計算、股價高或股價低、盈餘是否全數轉增資、除權後是否填權情況下，對股東權益產生何種不同程度的影響；再針對目前產業界，針對員工分紅費用化後，員工產生的實質所得減少，所回應的因應配套措施，探討其各項配套措施對員工權益、股東權益甚至產業界長久以往的影響。 經本研究觀察及探討，有以下發現，提供主管機關、投資人、企業及員工做為參考： 一、2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益仍極嚴重，且2004年至2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益情況並無往改善方向進行。 二、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理，無法真實反應公司盈餘、有違公司治理精神且無法與國際會計準則接軌。 三、在相關的簡化假設條件下，員工分紅配股對股東權益造成下列之影響： 1. 高股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 2. 低股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否仍不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 3.員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘不全數轉增資情況下，不論股價高低、填權與否，均可使期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 4. 高股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 5. 低股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率較高股價高。 四、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理下，大多數的公司選擇員工分紅配股的員工激勵制度。 五、員工分紅費用化後，使股東權益稀釋程度鎖住一固定比率、盈餘真實性提高、公司間可在同一基礎上相互比較、財務透明度提高並與國際接軌。 六、員工分紅費用化後，企業因應的員工激勵制度配套措施將呈現多樣化。 七、員工分紅費用化，對員工實質所得有相當大的影響；對股東為鎖住一固定比率的稀釋程度；對公司而言，可用的員工激勵措施資源減少；對產業，將形成好公司更好，壞公司更壞的循環。 === Following the outbreak of a series of scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, in the U.S. as from 2001, international institutional investors have been suspicious about whether financial statements can truly and adequately represent a company’s operating status, including the employee stock bonus system that had been carried out domestically for many years. As a matter or fact, while applying the system, local competent authorities, industries and academic circles have had a lot of concerns about the resulting problems, which triggers plenty of discussions and opinion exchanges. By observing the domestic employee stock bonus distribution for 2004 through 2006, this study aimed to investigate the issues of corporate governance and accounting principle applicability derived from current accounting process under the circumstance where employee stock bonuses fall in retained earnings. Also, by referring to examples given by Professor Sheree S. Ma in Accounting Research Monthly, the study added more parameters and hypothetic assumptions to explore the degree of the influence of employee stock bonus calculation (according to the face value or market price), the stock price (high or low), earnings recapitalization and price recovery status subsequent to the ex-right date on shareholders’ equity, followed by investigating the influence of the countermeasures taken in the industry to cope with the reduction of employee’s real income caused by treating employee stock bonuses as expenses on shareholders’ equity, employees’ real income, and even the industry for a long run. The following findings of the study hope to serve as a reference for competent authorities, investors, enterprises and employees: 1. Given that the dilution status of shareholders’ equity from 2004 to 2006 had not improved, the distribution of employee stock bonuses in 2006 was still severely diluting shareholders’ equity. 2. The current accounting process of combing employee stock bonuses in retained earnings cannot truly reflect a company’s earnings, which is not only against the spirit of corporate governance, but has also deviated from international accounting standards. 3. Under simplified hypothetical assumptions, the employee stock bonus distribution has generated the following influences on shareholders’ equity: (1). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (2.) Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (3). Under circumstance where employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are not all recapitalized as increased capital, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced no matter how high or low of the stock price, or if the stock price can be recovered subsequent to the ex-right date. (4). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are partially recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced. (5). Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be higher than that with high stock price. 4. Before 2008, the existing employee stock bonuses are processed as retained earnings distribution in accounting, a majority of companies choose employee stock ownership as an incentive to motivate their employees. 5. After employee stock bonuses are being treated as expenses, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity is locked at a fixed ratio. As a result, the veracity of company earnings is higher, so different companies may compare with each other on a same basis, financial transparency can be strengthened, and in the end, these companies operating performance can link up with the world. 6. With employee stock bonuses being treated as expenses, the countermeasures taken by enterprises to motivate their employees show versatility. 7. By treating employee stock bonuses as expenses, employee’s real income will be considerably affected, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity will be locked at a fixed rate, company’s available resources for motivating its employees will be reduced, and the whole industry will fall prey to the cycle that good companies get better while bad companies get worse.