| Summary: | 本論文由三篇文章所構成。第二章主要針對參考點（reference points）的選擇問題。在綠色國民所得帳中，選擇哪個參考點作為扣除環境質損與自然資源折耗是很重要的。由於既有文獻中的參考點選擇大多過於極端，本文遂針對文獻上的缺失，建議以法定的環保標準做為參考點，使得環境質損、環境效益、自然資源折耗與服務都可顯示出來。
第三章則以台灣的烏魚業為對象，以不合作賽局分析大陸漁民在烏魚迴游路徑上捕魚以及溫室效應對台灣漁業及消費者造成的影響。
第四章則指出Huang and Cai (1994)一文在理論模型設計上的問題，並提出改正，以使其論點獲得支持。 === This dissertation is made up of three essays that address the issues of green net national product, renewable resources and pollution externalities.
In Chapter 2, the issue of choosing reference points is discussed. The reference point is a key parameter for estimating the values of environmental degradation and natural resource depletion that are used to adjust the Net National Product. Most of the reference points used in the literature are extreme points in the spectrum of environmental quality and may thus result in estimated values of degradation and depletion that are not consistent with the standard theory of environmental economics. In this chapter, we argue that by using clearly defined standards as reference points, e.g., environmental quality standards, for managing environmental quality and natural resources, correct values of environmental degradation and services, and natural resource depletion and direct nature services, as well as green NNP can emerge.
In Chapter 3, we examine the problem of non-cooperative fishing between Mainland China (MC) and Taiwan (TW) as well as the effects of rising sea surface temperature (SST) on the grey mullet fishery. By setting the three stages of the non-cooperative game, it is shown that the expansion of the fleets in MC and the rising SST cause the rent obtained from the TW fishery to decline, and that Taiwan may partially offset such an adverse effect by adjusting its fleet size. This essay also shows that Taiwan can expand its fleet to a greater extent when facing an imperfectly elastic demand for fish than when facing a perfectly elastic demand. In addition, when consumer welfare is included in the determination of the size of the fleet, fleet size can expand more than when profit is considered alone.
In Chapter 4, we point out the problems in Huang and Cai (1994) that arise from the absence of a “pollution externality.” We modify their model by introducing the emission tax and find that it supports Huang and Cai (1994)’s claim that the share of private abatement expenditure is constant at all times, a claim that is criticized by Shieh, et al. (2001).
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