| Summary: | 本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象，探討具有會計專長之執行長（CEO）與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前，本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響，透過此結果，推論專業人士（包含會計師與分析師）與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期，當CEO具有會計專長時，會使盈餘品質降低，故審計風險隨之提高，導致審計公費增加，且分析師的追隨意願降低，同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。
研究結果發現，具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關，與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關，顯示當CEO具有會計專長時，因有盈餘操控的情況，所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少；但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實，故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO，有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 === This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015.
Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions.
The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.
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