董事會結構、市場機制與企業價值之關聯性 －台灣市場之實證

• Main Author: 詹捷宇
• Language: 中文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 公司治理; 市場機制; 企業價值; Corporate Governance; Market Mechanisms; Corporate value
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0101355032%22.

良好的公司治理不只強調於公司與股東之間之良好關係，更希望以此帶給社會環境正向影響。本研究研究公司治理對企業價值之影響。研究貢獻在於整合公司內部治理機制(董事會結構)與外部市場機制，探討其與公司價值直接與間接之關聯性。本研究以2008年至2012年之台灣上市公司為樣本，以企業價值為應變數，董事會結構(董事會規模、CEO雙元性與外部董事席次比率)及市場機制(資訊揭露透明度、分析師預測頻率、機構投資人持股率)為主要解釋變數，除探討解釋變數與企業價值之直接影響力外，也透過交乘項了解市場機制是否對公司治理與企業價值有間接影響效果。在控制企業風險、成長、獲利與規模大小因素後，利用追蹤資料迴歸模型進行分析。 本研究之結論為以下三部分：(一)董事會成員背景更多元、吸納更多外部專業人士之組合，可強化其監督機制，提升公司價值。(二) 市場可藉由分析師對公司之關注度與預測頻率，有效監督公司經營團隊，提升公司價值。(三) 董事會外部董事席次比率與分析師預測頻率存在互補效果，在資訊不對稱下能夠透過資訊互補達到有效監督，進而提升公司價值。 台灣企業多為家族企業或是強人治理公司之公司形態，為了強化個人或是家族之控制權，往往以內部董事為多數，雖能夠提升決策效率，卻易囿於內部個人成見與利益。透過本研究對台灣市場之實證，希望能提供企業董事會與外部主管機關在決策上之建議，並強化市場機制對於公司治理之監督之概念。 === The main purpose of this study is to examine the influences of governance mechanisms on corporate value. What’s more, this research measures governance mechanisms via integrated sources based on direct and indirect mechanism to learn further more about the effect can improve corporate monitoring mechanism, and then further enhance corporate performance. Based on the samples of Taiwan listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2012, this study employs panel regression model with Corporate value (Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variable against various combinations of internal governance mechanisms variables (Board size, CEO duality, Outside Director)and external market mechanisms variables( Information Disclosure and Transparency, Frequency of Analyst Forecasts, Institutional Investors’ Ownership). The conclusion of this study is the following three parts: (1) when the board have more diverse background, it can attract more external professionals and strengthen its monitoring mechanism to enhance company value. (2) The market can supervise the management team effectively and enhance the company's value by the frequency of analyst forecast (3) Outside directors and the frequency of analysts forecast are complementary, which can enhance the transparency of information, which prompted the company has more neutral and objective supervision team to help the board lead the management team to create long-term value for the company. Companies in Taiwan are mostly family control or centralized. However, it could be easily restricted by the personal prejudices and interests. Through this research about the experience of Taiwan market, hoping provide the advices on corporate boards and external authorities to reinforce the market mechanisms for oversight of corporate governance.