| Summary: | 功能性委員會－薪酬委員會之設置可被認為是強化公司治理的關鍵之一，
其主要功能是在於協助公司完成健全高階經理人之考核與薪酬管理制度，並讓
公司治理結構更加完善。薪酬委員會之設置已在歐美國家行之有年，而我國至
最近 2011 年才強制上市櫃及興櫃公司設置薪酬委員會，目的在於希望藉由薪
酬委員會之設置能有助於屏除公司經營團隊存有肥貓之疑慮。而距離實施已有
一年之時間，本研究主要在於探討現階段上市櫃公司薪酬委員會組成及品質與
代理問題之關聯性。實證結果發現：由公股主導之上市櫃公司，委員會委員擁
有學術背景之佔比愈高；專業經理人治理及盈餘分配比愈高之上市櫃公司，委
員會委員擁有企業界背景之佔比愈高；機構投資人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，
委員會委員擁有學術及企業兩者經驗之佔比愈高；經理人持股愈高、機構投資
人持股比愈高之上市櫃公司，薪酬委員會品質愈佳；盈餘分配比愈高、有交叉
持股行為之上市櫃公司，其薪酬委員會品質愈差。 === The compensation committee plays an important role in enhancing cooperate governance. The purpose of the compensation committee is not only to administer and evaluate the company's compensation policies for the board of directors, but also to set appropriate and supportable pay programs for the CEO and other executive officers of the company. The existence of compensation committee is common in developed countries, but was just required in Taiwan since 2011. Therefore, this paper mainly focuses on the composition of compensation committee and its quality associated with agency problem. By using sample of 1,440 listed companies in Taiwan, the result shows that government-owned corporations tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members from academic background; companies ruled by managers tend to have a higher proportion of their compensation committee members with business background; the higher the proportion of institutional investors in the company, the higher the proportion of the compensation committee members possess both academic and business experience. In addition, CEO’s shareholding and institutional investors’ shareholding are positively associated with the quality of the compensation committee. However, the cash flow right is negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee; a company with cross-shareholding characteristic is also negatively associated with the quality of the compensation committee.
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