公司治理機制對企業績效與董監薪酬之影響

• Main Author: 葉旻其
• Language: 中文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Subjects: 公司治理; 企業績效; 董監薪酬; 薪酬績效連結性; Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; Board Compensation; Pay-Performance Sensitivity
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0096353003%22.

本研究從家族治理、機構投資人持股、董事會組成、董事會效能之角度探討公司治理機制對企業績效與董監薪酬之影響。家族治理方面，家族持股愈多，企業績效愈好，但家族參與經營程度愈高，企業績效卻愈差；而家族治理下，董監薪酬水準、薪酬績效連結性均較低。機構投資者方面，本國金融機構持股愈高，企業績效愈高。董事會組成方面，董事長兼總經理下，企業績效較差、董監薪酬績效連結性較低，而執行董事、獨立董監席次比例愈高，企業績效、董監薪酬績效連結性均愈高；董事長兼總經理下及執行董事席次比例愈高時，董監薪酬水準愈低，而獨立董監席次比例愈高，董監薪酬水準愈高。董事會效能方面，正常營運下之企業，董事會開會次數愈多、出席率愈高，企業績效均提升；董事會出席率愈高，董監薪酬水準、薪酬績效連結性均愈高。 === The study uses family governance, institutional ownership, board structure, and board activities to empirically investigate the influence of corporate governance on firm performance and board compensation. Empirical result shows that the firm performance is higher when family ownership, institutional ownership, executive directors, independent board members, and board activities increase, and that the firm performance is lower when family involvement increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person. In addition, the board compensation is higher when independent board members and board activities increase, and the board compensation are lower when family governance, institutional ownership, executive directors increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person. Moreover, the pay-performance sensitivity is higher when institutional ownership, executive directors, independent board members, and board activities increase, and the pay-performance sensitivity is lower when family governance increase and when chairman and CEO is the same person.