| Summary: | 改革開放以來，哪些菁英受到中共高層的重用？菁英流動的特性為何？背後是否具有一致的運作邏輯？本論文主要目的在於探索與釐清中國大陸菁英流動演變的型態，以及背後運作的邏輯。
在理論上，本論文從共黨政權演變的視角出發，採用組織理論的脈絡建構中共的菁英甄補邏輯。在組織邏輯下，本文認為改革開放的「經濟發展」路線，是中共為維持「專政」生存的工具性目標。而由於江澤民、胡錦濤依序接班後仍依循鄧小平改革開放的基本路線，這使得改革開放至今中國大陸政治菁英甄補與流動模式具有相當一致性的邏輯：即彰顯「專政」生存目的與「發展」工具性目的的政權演變特性。中共將依外在環境與組織目標的改變來調整內部成員，但調整的幅度與廣度將不會危害其執政地位，使得菁英流動呈現「有限活化」（limited renewal）的特色。
為了檢驗中共「有限活化」菁英體制的研究假設，本研究針對1978年3月至2008年3月曾任黨政正省部級職務（含以上）政治菁英進行系統性的實證分析。實證結果發現中共黨政菁英在納入新甄補元素的過程裡，的確具有專政地位維持的生存考量，符合本研究的理論預期。另一方面，雖然近年來外界強調中國菁英技術官僚的特質，但本文發現能夠在黨政領導職務任職時間較長，以及較快晉升至領導人職務的政治菁英，大多是前一個層級出身或具有黨職領導經歷者。這表示中共透過各級黨職歷練的規範，來確保這些領導菁英與黨意識型態路線或利益一致性。值得注意的是如此的甄補邏輯，改革開放至今並無系統性的改變。
最後，本論文也嘗試以菁英途徑解釋中國大陸未來的政體發展走向。透過有限活化菁英體制的現象檢證，我們認為菁英甄補的組織邏輯，應是中國大陸自80年代以來之所以能在快速經濟發展下維持共黨專政的重要因素。以此，本文認為中共在發展出以「黨職經歷」為重要資格的更替與晉升遊戲規則，短期內高層領導人應不至出現菁英分裂與衝突。而本文透過菁英流動課題來釐清中共「專政」與「發展」目的之邏輯本質，或許也能作為外界進一步闡述中共推行政治改革措施的思路。
=== What kinds of political elites have been recruited and promoted by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Reform Era? What are the characteristics of elite mobility in China? Is there a consistent inner-logic governing the selection and promotion of Chinese elites? To answer these questions, the thesis explores the continuity and change of political elite mobility in Mainland China, from 1978 to 2008.
Theoretically, the author reveals the inner-logic of elite recruitment throughout China’s reform era by using the explanatory framework of organizational theory against the background of communist regime transition. According to the organization logic, “economic development” is merely a functional tool serving the higher ends of “one-party dictatorship” - the survival prerequisite for the CCP. Therefore, due to Jiang and Hu’s succession of party courses set by Deng, China’s elite recruitment and mobility have consistently embodied this organizational logic: While balancing between the survival prerequisite of one-party dictatorship and the functional target of economic development, the CCP has, on the one hand, adjusted its membership configuration in response to changing environment and organizational goals; whereas on the other hand, controlled the adjustment to a degree posting no threat to its ruling position, hence produced the characteristics of limited renewal within China’s elite mobility.
To attest the theoretical hypothesis of limited renewal, the author conducts the systematic empirical studies on all the political elites who have worked on province and ministry level positions (and above) within the Chinese government and communist party from March, 1978 to March, 2008. As the empirical result shows, and consequently, confirms the hypothesis: the CCP did have assigned significant weight to the survival consideration in the process of elite recruitment. At the same time, despite the recent scholars focus on the rise of Chinese technocrats, the author however finds that, among the rising elites, those who worked longer in, or promoted faster to, the government and/or party positions, the crucial similarity they share lies not in the technocratic background but their party-position appointments on a lower level immediately before their promotions to leadership positions. This pattern of promotion demonstrated that the CCP has been using the party-positions experience as a required qualification for promotion, so as to ensure the elites’ alliance with party interest and loyalty to party ideology. Moreover, these recruiting and promoting principles have undergone no systematic changes throughout the period of the Reform Era.
Finally, from the perspective of elite mobility, the author attempts to depict the potential direction of China’s regime development in the future. Having approved the pattern of limited renewal in China’s elite configuration and mobility, the author believes that the current recruiting criteria and the underlying organizational logic have significantly contributed to the success of the CCP in maintaining one-party dictatorship amid rapid economic development. Therefore, the author predicts that the likelihood for elite conflicts would remain fairly low, if the promotion requirement of party-position experience continues to function. But nevertheless, the research of elite mobility would uncover the inner logical relationship between the apparently-contradictory goals of dictatorship and development, which paved the way for the survival and the success of the CCP.
|
|---|
