Why does a firm keep "Sleeping Patents"? From the perespective of quality and depreciation
We investigate why a firm hold “Sleeping Patents” in a two period model. Two main results are found by our simulation analysis. First, the larger the depreciation measure of the new patent goods is, the greater the possibility of not exercising new patent is, even if the new patent is still more p...
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| Language: | 英文 |
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國立政治大學
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| Online Access: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22G0092351011%22. |
| Summary: | We investigate why a firm hold “Sleeping Patents” in a two period model. Two main results are found by our simulation analysis. First, the larger the depreciation measure of the new patent goods is, the greater the possibility of not exercising new patent is, even if the new patent is still more profitable than the old in one-stage model. Second, the possibilities to exercise the less profitable patent increases if a monopolist can commit its stage-two quantity in stage one. |
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