| Summary: | 住宅市場是典型的不完全訊息市場，每個市場參與者並不知道潛在交易對象的所在位置、偏好，與保留價格。不完全訊息意涵著，交易者必須透過搜尋才能找到交易對象，因而必須支付搜尋成本，也會形成搜尋市場。不論是住宅交易的買方或者賣方，都可以選擇是自行搜尋交易對象，或者透過仲介業者來協助交易的達成。然而，仲介業者對於住宅搜尋市場之影響，目前仍存在著許多問題是尚待釐清的，而拍賣市場在台灣所扮演的重要性愈來愈高，其市場機制的價格效果也是值得關注的問題：
一、跨區購屋、定錨行為與仲介服務效果
買賣房屋幾乎必然會有議價過程，雙方的議價能力除了受到市場條件的影響外，賣方對於本身所蓋或者所擁有的房屋及附近地區市場等資訊都較買方為多，因此賣方處於較有利的地位。因此，本研究的第一個研究問題即是：就購屋者彼此之間，在地購屋者是否比跨區購屋者具有訊息優勢？參考價格偏誤是否存在？具有訊息優勢的仲介服務能否改善購屋者的搜尋成本與參考價格偏誤？本研究實證結果顯示，基於搜尋成本較高的原因，跨鄉鎮市區的跨區購屋者相對於未跨區者需要多支付3.8%的價格貼水。其次，參考價格愈高的地區，其購屋者會因為定錨效果或參考點偏誤而多支付1%的價格貼水，此外，高價格分配信念的購屋者，平均會支付4.9%的價格貼水。第三，地價上漲率較高地區的購屋者，會誤用自身地區的外推性預期，以為遷入地區也有同等的價格增值空間，而多支付約11.4%的價格貼水。最後，購屋者若尋求仲介服務亦能改善其出價能力，約可降低2.9%的價格貼水，然而，仲介服務在改善搜尋成本與定錨的效果方面則不顯著。
二、仲介服務對於價格分散之影響
本研究利用搜尋成本與價格分散的觀點，檢視具有訊息優勢的仲介服務業者是否真能提高住宅市場的價格搜尋效率。以台北地區的住宅市場資料，指出仲介服務的存在的確可以提高購屋者的搜尋能力。價格分散的估計與檢定結果則顯示：第一，購屋者成交價價格分散小於訂價價格分散；第二，透過仲介服務搜尋者訂價價格分散未顯著異於自行搜尋者的訂價價格分散，可是透過仲介服務搜尋者的成交價價格分散則顯著小於自行搜尋者的成交價價格分散，同時透過仲介服務的價格收斂比率較高。此乃表示，仲介服務業者並未運用其訊息優勢協助賣方進行較有效率的訂價，但是能有效地協助買賣雙方透過配對與議價活動，大幅地降低成交價的價格分散程度。此外，進一步比較國內相關研究結果，目前台北市的住宅市場訊息效率已較過去有顯著的改善，特別是透過仲介服務的改善效果更為明顯。
三、不對稱的仲介服務價格效果
過去有關仲介服務對於交易價格影響的實證結果卻出現許多分歧而不一致的現象，本研究認為過去相關文獻的差異，可能源自以普通最小平方迴歸的方式來估計仲介服務的價格效果時，會忽略住宅價格條件分配的差異。以分量迴歸估計後發現，仲介服務係數在各價格分量呈現很大的差異且顯著，仲介服務的價格效果，在0.10分量約有4.4%的溢價，而 0.75分量以上則約有-5.6%的折價現象。因此，本研究嘗試以高低價格分量的不對稱訂價策略，作為仲介服務價格效果不一致的現象的檢視觀點，並得到實證上的支持。
四、搜尋與拍賣市場機制選擇及拍賣市場績效之再檢視
拍賣市場為購屋者的重要次級市場之一，因此拍賣市場的績效就顯得愈來愈重要。本研究考慮了購屋者的搜尋成本對於市場機制自我選擇偏誤的影響，重新檢視拍賣市場的績效。本研究實證結果顯示，在未考慮自我選擇偏誤下，拍賣市場機制的估計係數為-22.6%，且達1%統計顯著水準。但是，在控制買方與物件的自我選擇偏誤後，我國拍賣市場與搜尋市場間並無顯著的價格差異存在，因而本研究對於過去國內相關文獻認為拍賣市場一定比搜尋市場折價較多的說法，提出了相當的質疑。惟此三年間我國北部地區拍賣市場的拍定率從10%快速成長到30%，而市場條件的快速變化，很可能會造成較大的拍賣價格變異。因此在後續研究上，可以比較拍定率差異較大的時間進行比較研究，以了解本研究結果之穩定度。
=== This dissertation employs search theory and behavior theory to study four relative essays. The first essay is to test three questions using a unique data base in the viewpoint of search cost and Anchoring behavior: First, is there anchoring effect or reference price bias on home-purchasing behavior? Second, is there any extrapolative expectation effect of reference price change on homebuyers? Third, can homebuyers reduce price premium from their high search cost or perceived bias? Those answers can help us understand if we can get alternative interpretation to housing price dispersion and if government should provide housing information service. Empirically, we find that out-of-town/district buyers pay a statistically significant price premium in the Taipei area. We also find some evidence consistent with the price premium being driven by high search costs, anchoring effect and extrapolative expectation from heuristics. Finally, homebuyers can lower price premium through real estate brokers in the market.
The second essay is to examine the efficiency of housing and brokerage markets in view of price dispersion. We find brokerage service enhance the search ability of homebuyers. We use listing price prices as the prices before search and the actual transaction prices as the price after search, and we also separate the sample into search by homebuyers and search by broker. We find that search by broker decreases the price dispersion compared to search by homebuyers. The third essay is try to explain a number of past and recent studies provided conflicting empirical answers to the effect of real estate brokerage service on housing price. We employ quantile regression to capture the behavior at each quantile of conditional house price distribution and to test the asymmetric effects of brokerage service. An important findings of this paper is that the price effects of real estate brokerage service are significant heterogeneous across the conditional price distribution. The contribution of this paper to the prior literature is to provide empirical evidence by showing that broker might have a positive, negative, or zero impact on the housing prices.
The final essay is to discuss the decision making behavior of housing markets mechanism choice. Real estate auction market has been one of main market mechanisms of home purchase. Therefore, the performance of real estate auctions is a very important issue. This article reviews the price premium or discount of real estate auctions by correcting the self-selectivity bias in a view of homebuyers’ search cost. The empirical result shows that the availability of an auction as an alternative has the result of high search cost buyers attending auctions. Next, after accounting for the endogenous nature of this choice and controlling for property and buyer characteristics, prices of properties sold at auction were not lower than those of comparable properties sold in a search market. It is questionable to say the performance of real estate auctions is inferior to that of negotiated sales at Taiwan.
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