| Summary: | 資訊揭露的議題一直受到學者的研究探討；企業、投資人及競爭者間的微妙互動，現實中說謊的情境及強制揭露的規定，種種因素加諸後對於企業揭露之影響為本文之研究動機及目的。
經濟學上強調市場自由的機制，強制性揭露在直覺上應會為企業帶來價值的減損，本文就自願性揭露的均衡來延伸推論若強制其揭露後所帶來的損失；另外過去分析性研究中強調企業揭露資訊皆為真，也就是企業不說謊，但現實中並非如此；本文利用簡單的賽局概念及並參考Wagenhofer（1990）集合的推論方式，對於說謊情境下的揭露均衡及強制性揭露可能為企業帶來的價值減損作一推論，並簡單的加以比較分析
本文之研究結果如下：
1、在可能說謊的情境下，企業並未必會揭露更多的資訊，雖然完全的揭露均衡存在，但條件相當嚴苛，因此部分揭露的範圍及可能性均增加。
2、不論在是否能夠說謊的情境中，強制性揭露的規定均會為企業帶來價值的減損。
3、在強制性的揭露下，說謊對於企業價值減損的影響並不一定，因為比較說謊與不說謊情境的不揭露的範圍大小並不一定，端視企業對於及市場投資大眾對於E(L*)的評價而定，當不揭露的範圍擴大，一但強制揭露，面臨損失的機會較大，反之則較小。
=== Disclosure of information has been a topic of concern for a number of years. The relationship between enterprises, investors and competitors, lies in real world , rules of mandatory disclosure would have effects of enterprises’ decisions of disclosure. The effects are the motivation and the purpose of our research.
Economic emphasizes the machinery of freedom of market. Mandatory disclosure in economical intuition would bring some loss of value of enterprises. In our research, we extend the result of research in the past to infer the loss of value of enterprises in mandatory disclosure system. Besides, the analytic research in the past supposed that information disclosed by enterprises was true, but it is not. We use simple idea of game theory and to consult the way that Wagenhofer (1990) used to infer the possible loss brought by mandatory disclosure and compare the results under different conditions.
Our results are: (1)Under the condition of possible lying, enterprises are not necessary to disclose more information. The equilibrium of full disclosure still exists, but the assumption is very strict. (2)No matter under what kind of conditions , mandatory disclosure would bring loss of value of enterprise which compares to the result under voluntary disclosure. (3)Under mandatory disclosure system , the effect of loss of lying is not sure, because of the scope of nondisclosure is not sure. It depends on the degree of and the investors’ valuation of E(L*).
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