關係人交易附註揭露有用性及其資訊特性之研究

• Main Authors: 林維珩, Lin, Wei-Heng
• Language: 中文
• Published: 國立政治大學
• Online Access: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/cgi-bin/cdrfb3/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&i=sid=%22A2002000647%22.

本研究以常見於臺灣上市公司財務報表之關係人交易為研究主題，探討此一財務報表附註資訊之有用性，並進一步分析其資訊特性。關係人交易為本期全部影響財務報表之交易的一部分，在會計準則制定機構要求下，於財務報表附註中揭露此明細項目資訊。由於關係企業為國內企業經營方式主流，關係人交易之財務報表分析之重要性可見一般。 本研究探討關係人交易對於外部股東之資訊價值，分別以提供代理成本資訊、盈餘品質訊息以及評價攸關性三方面加以分析。由於財務報表附註中之關係人交易項目包括許多損益科目及資產負債科目之金額，過去文獻直接以絕對金額相加有違會計意義，本研究採取經濟統計作法，以各項目當年度發生比重相對高低，給予一與零分，將分數合計而得綜合分數。類似方法亦應用於前後期關係人交易之增減，以及定義之特殊關係人交易是否發生，共產生三種關係人交易指標，據以探討關係人交易對必要報酬及盈餘品質之影響。 實證結果顯示財務報表中之關係人交易附註可以提供外部股東權益代理問題之攸關資訊。首次揭露關係人交易公司，揭露後之系統風險顯著高於揭露前。對於董監持股比率合計數較低者，本研究之三種關係人交易指標皆可區別出不同的企業系統風險；換言之，當代理成本較高時，關係人交易附註資訊之價值即顯露出來。 不過關係人交易多寡、增減情形以及是否特殊關係人交易，對於盈餘反應係數並無顯著影響。由於並無其他情境變數，不排除不同種類關係人交易對盈餘之影響相互綜合抵銷，致實證結果無法支持關係人交易影響盈餘品質之假說。 至於關係人交易附註中各揭露項目之評價攸關性方面，實證結果顯示根據關係人交易附註資訊解構盈餘，的確增加解釋股票報酬之能力。而來自關係人交易損益之係數異非關係人交易損益之係數，顯示關係人交易附註之攸關性。至於揭露程度方面，實證結果支持英國會計準則制定機構之看法，凡是重大之關係人交易皆為投資人所關心，不宜僅揭露特殊之關係人交易。 === One of the salient feature of business environment in Taiwan is the formation of business groups. Companies are tied by various relationships, not necessarily through investment. Accordingly, transactions among affiliated companies are commonly seen. Financial accounting standards require related party footnote disclosure on relationships and transactions. Current study focuses on the usefulness of related party transaction disclosure. The attributed of information contained in the disclosure are also studied. This study hypothesizes that the information value of related party transaction disclosure comes from the information concerning equity agency cost and/or earnings quality. The usefulness of the disclosure is further demonstrated via the incremental information content analysis. Previous studies sum transaction amounts across various disclosure items. Balance sheet accounts and income statement accounts are therefore blended. This study improves the design by way of formation of indicators from various related party transaction disclosure items in a manner similar to the income strategy approach adopted by Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981). In addition, a bivariate indicating the occurrence of special transaction items is defined. The empirical results confirm that related party transaction disclosure provides useful information on equity agency costs. For those firms that first disclose related party transactions in financial statements, their systematic risk is significantly higher. Further, indicators from related party transactions disclosure items help differentiate systematic risks. When equity agency costs are expected to be higher, related party transaction disclosure is valuable to investors. However, this study fails to document the hypothesized negative impact of related party transactions on earnings quality. The earnings response coefficients are not significant for all indicators. It is acknowledged that firm-specific factors are difficult to control in the research design. As related party transactions are a subset of total transactions incurred in the accounting period, footnote disclosure is used to decompose earnings. Unequal coefficients between earnings from related party transactions and earnings from outsiders imply that knowing earnings from related parties from footnote disclosure helps investors to price the firm. In addition, the empirical results support the idea that current extent of disclosure is better than the proposal to limit disclosure to abcdrmal related party transactions. In sum, focusing on the investing decisions, this study give empirical evidence of the usefulness of related party transaction disclosure. The disclosure is also found to be helpful in providing equity agency cost information.