Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness

We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves into ar...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chen, Jing (Contributor), Micali, Silvio (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier, 2015-09-22T18:40:50Z.
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by Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio
Published 2022
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