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95939 |
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|a Banerjee, Abhijit
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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|a Banerjee, Abhijit
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|a Duflo, Esther
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|a Duflo, Esther
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|a Hornbeck, Richard
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|a Bundling Health Insurance and Microfinance in India: There Cannot be Adverse Selection if There Is No Demand
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|b American Economic Association,
|c 2015-03-10T18:54:59Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/95939
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|a Microfinance institutions have started to bundle their basic loans with other financial services, such as health insurance. Using a randomized control trial in Karnataka, India, we evaluate the impact on loan renewal from mandating the purchase of actuarially-fair health insurance covering hospitalization and maternity expenses. Bundling loans with insurance led to a 16 percentage points (23 percent) increase in drop-out from microfinance, as many clients preferred to give up microfinance than pay higher interest rates and receive insurance. In a Pyrrhic victory, the total absence of demand for health insurance led to there being no adverse selection in insurance enrollment.
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|a National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant PO1 HD061315-04)
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|a en_US
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|a Article
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|t American Economic Review
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