Matching with couples revisited
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of cou...
Main Authors: | Ashlagi, Itai (Contributor), Braverman, Mark (Author), Hassidim, Avinatan (Author) |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery,
2014-06-02T17:22:51Z.
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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