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|a Farhi, Emmanuel
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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|a Werning, Ivan
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|a Werning, Ivan
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|a Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
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|b American Economic Association,
|c 2013-12-09T13:20:19Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876
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|a We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries.
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|a en_US
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|a Article
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|t American Economic Review
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