Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity

We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specificatio...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Farhi, Emmanuel (Author), Werning, Ivan (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: American Economic Association, 2013-12-09T13:20:19Z.
Subjects:
Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Werning, Ivan  |e contributor 
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520 |a We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries. 
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773 |t American Economic Review