|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
01410 am a22002173u 4500 |
| 001 |
82613 |
| 042 |
|
|
|a dc
|
| 100 |
1 |
0 |
|a Banerjee, Abhijit
|e author
|
| 100 |
1 |
0 |
|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
|e contributor
|
| 100 |
1 |
0 |
|a Banerjee, Abhijit
|e contributor
|
| 100 |
1 |
0 |
|a Duflo, Esther
|e contributor
|
| 700 |
1 |
0 |
|a Duflo, Esther
|e author
|
| 700 |
1 |
0 |
|a Ghatak, Maitreesh
|e author
|
| 700 |
1 |
0 |
|a Lafortune, Jeanne
|e author
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India
|
| 260 |
|
|
|b American Economic Association,
|c 2013-11-27T19:38:20Z.
|
| 856 |
|
|
|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82613
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one's own group or for "marrying up." We then estimate actual preferences for caste and other attributes using a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements and find only a strong preference for in-caste marriage. This translates, in equilibrium, in caste doing little to alter the matching patterns on non-caste attributes.
|
| 546 |
|
|
|a en_US
|
| 655 |
7 |
|
|a Article
|
| 773 |
|
|
|t American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
