They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices

Wireless communication has become an intrinsic part of modern implantable medical devices (IMDs). Recent work, however, has demonstrated that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the confidentiality of IMDs' transmitted data or to send unauthorized commands to IMDs---even comman...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gollakota, Shyamnath (Contributor), Hassanieh, Haitham (Contributor), Ransford, Benjamin (Author), Katabi, Dina (Contributor), Fu, Kevin (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2012-09-06T17:54:43Z.
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Summary:Wireless communication has become an intrinsic part of modern implantable medical devices (IMDs). Recent work, however, has demonstrated that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the confidentiality of IMDs' transmitted data or to send unauthorized commands to IMDs---even commands that cause the device to deliver an electric shock to the patient. The key challenge in addressing these attacks stems from the difficulty of modifying or replacing already-implanted IMDs. Thus, in this paper, we explore the feasibility of protecting an implantable device from such attacks without modifying the device itself. We present a physical-layer solution that delegates the security of an IMD to a personal base station called the shield. The shield uses a novel radio design that can act as a jammer-cum-receiver. This design allows it to jam the IMD's messages, preventing others from decoding them while being able to decode them itself. It also allows the shield to jam unauthorized commands---even those that try to alter the shield's own transmissions. We implement our design in a software radio and evaluate it with commercial IMDs. We find that it effectively provides confidentiality for private data and protects the IMD from unauthorized commands.
National Science Foundation (U.S.). (Grant number CNS-0831244)
National Science Foundation (U.S.). Graduate Research Fellowship Program
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Fellowship
United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Cooperative Agreement (90TR0003/01)