Optimal Mandates and The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost, or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs. To do...
Main Authors: | Einav, Liran (Author), Schrimpf, Paul Thomas (Contributor), Finkelstein, Amy (Contributor) |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Econometric Society,
2010-04-02T18:29:20Z.
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
Similar Items
-
Testing for Asymmetric Information Using "Unused Observables" in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
by: Finkelstein, Amy, et al.
Published: (2015) -
The Response of Drug Expenditure to Nonlinear Contract Design: Evidence from Medicare Part D *
by: Einav, Liran, et al.
Published: (2018) -
Estimating Welfare In Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices
by: Finkelstein, Amy, et al.
Published: (2010) -
Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts
by: Einav, Liran, et al.
Published: (2019) -
Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures
by: Einav, Liran, et al.
Published: (2011)