Justified Communication Equilibrium
<jats:p> Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than rece...
Main Authors: | Clark, Daniel (Author), Fudenberg, Drew (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
American Economic Association,
2022-08-26T17:59:40Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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