An argument against causal decision theory
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the prefere...
Main Author: | Spencer, Jack (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford University Press (OUP),
2022-08-12T17:19:55Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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