An argument against causal decision theory

An argument against causal decision theory

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the prefere...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Spencer, Jack (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press (OUP), 2022-08-12T17:19:55Z.
Subjects:
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Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Spencer, Jack  |e author 
245 0 0 |a An argument against causal decision theory 
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856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144348 
520 |a <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.</jats:p> 
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655 7 |a Article 
773 |t 10.1093/ANALYS/ANAA037 
773 |t Analysis 

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