All-pay auctions as models for military annexation

All-pay auctions as models for military annexation

Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kang, Benjamin (Author), Unwin, James (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2022-07-27T14:57:39Z.
Subjects:
Article
Online Access:Get fulltext
LEADER 00896 am a22001453u 4500
001 144067
042 |a dc 
100 1 0 |a Kang, Benjamin  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Unwin, James  |e author 
245 0 0 |a All-pay auctions as models for military annexation 
260 |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg,   |c 2022-07-27T14:57:39Z. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067 
520 |a Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. 
546 |a en 
655 7 |a Article 

Similar Items